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Abstract
We explore how the share of the private sector in total external debt a®ects
perceived creditworthiness and the likelihood of sovereign default in devel-
oping countries. While there are theoretical arguments both in favor and
against a stabilizing role of private-sector borrowing, the evidence clearly
supports the notion that a greater share of the private sector in total ex-
ternal debt is associated with a reduced likelihood of sovereign default.
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11 Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a sustained and accelerating increase of
private foreign borrowing in emerging markets and developing countries. While
in 1990 the private sector accounted for a mere 16 percent of all external loans
disbursed to countries covered by the World Bank's Global Development Finance,
this share has increased to 77 percent in 2006 (see Figure 1a). This trend is also
re°ected by the evolution of debt stocks: in 2006, the share of liabilities that were
held by private agents (and that were not publicly guaranteed) accounted for 44
percent of developing countries' total external debt { up from a mere 5 percent
in 1990 (see Figure 1b).1
Of course, these aggregate ¯gures mask a substantial degree of cross-country
heterogeneity: Figure 2 illustrates how total external debt (as a portion of GNI)
and the private sector's share in external debt evolved in four countries. In all
cases, external debt hovered between 30 and 80 percent of GNI for most of the
nineties. However, in Chile, the share of the private sector has typically been high
relative to most emerging markets and increased further in the 1990s, while in
Turkey the share grew considerably since the mid 1990s from relatively low levels.
The private sector's role has remained more muted in Indonesia, and in Pakistan
private sector debt represented and still represents only a negligible share of total
external debt.
In this paper, we investigate whether the increasing importance of private
sector borrowing matters for sovereign creditworthiness in developing countries.
On theoretical grounds, there are arguments both in favor and against a stabiliz-
ing role of the private sector. A critical view of private-sector exposure is based
1Figure 1 and the following ¯gures refer to Long-term debt, which comprises instruments
that have an original or extended maturity of more than one year (World Bank (2007b)).
Comprehensive data on private versus public external debt and borrowing is available only for
long-term debt instruments.
2on the notion that large-scale private borrowing creates vulnerabilities that may
eventually lead to a sovereign default. A \sudden stop"may force the public sec-
tor to assume at least part of the private debt and the associated real exchange
rate depreciation may cause debt-service di±culties for the government. Follow-
ing this logic, both public and private external debt pose a threat to external
¯scal sustainability. The opposite argument that private sector borrowing does
not harm government creditworthiness can be made by invoking the idea that the
private sector is exposed to greater competitive pressure, which raises the incen-
tives to use the borrowed funds productively. Moreover, a potentially stabilizing
role of private sector borrowing can be linked to the distributional consequences
of sovereign defaults: agents who are reliant on foreign credit are particularly
vulnerable to the disruptions that come along with sovereign default. A larger
share of the private sector in total external debt{a proxy of the relative size and
stake of agents that would be hurt by sovereign default{would thus raise the
political costs of default and reduce its attractiveness to the government.
Given the competing theoretical arguments, the role of the private sector for
sovereign creditworthiness is ultimately an empirical question. A ¯rst impression
of how these magnitudes may be related is provided by Figure 3, which plots the
Institutional Investor's measure of country creditworthiness (IICCR) against
the level of external debt relative to GNI (Figure 3a) and the share of private
long-term external debt in countries' total long-term external debt (Figure 3b).2
Not surprisingly, the correlation between debt and creditworthiness is negative (-
0.37). By contrast, the correlation between private-sector share and the IICCR is
positive (0.54).3 While this picture obviously doesn't prove a causal relationship,
2For the IICCR, the data points refer to ¯ve-year averages between 1980 and 2005, while
the debt-variables are measured at the beginning of these ¯ve-year periods.
3In both cases, extreme observations seem to play a prominent role. If we remove the top
¯ve percent of the debt variable observations { limiting our attention to countries with debt-to-
GNI-ratios below 200 percent and a share of the private sector below 40 percent, respectively {
3it suggests that relative private-sector exposure and perceived creditworthiness
are positively related.
Further evidence that private and public debt are likely to have very di®erent
e®ects on the risk of sovereign default is provided by Table 1. The entries in
this table are cross-country averages of various debt-related variables just before
the onset of ¯ve-year periods in which a sovereign default did or did not take
place.4 The ¯rst column of Table 1 shows that initial debt relative to GNI is, on
average, much higher before a default period than before a non-default period.
Conversely, column 2 indicates that the average share of the private sector in
total external debt is much higher before non-default periods than before default
periods.
Ini. Ext. Debt/GNI Ini. Private Ext. Debt/ Ext. Debt
Default in t 108.51 5.02
No default in t 55.33 10.59
Table 1: Debt variables before defaults
Sources: World Bank (2007b) and Standard and Poor's (2007).
A ¯rst look at the data thus seems to point into the direction that a higher
share of private debt in total external debt is associated with higher perceived
creditworthiness { as re°ected by the Institutional Investor's country credit rat-
ings { and with a lower likelihood of sovereign default. The aim of this paper
is to subject this hypothesis to closer scrutiny: does the composition of external
the correlation in Figure 3a becomes -0.43, while the correlation in Figure 3b decreases to 0.46.
4Here and in what follows we adopt the de¯nition of the rating agency Standard and Poor's
which identi¯es a sovereign default as the \...failure to meet a principal or interest payment on
the due date (or within the speci¯ed grace period) contained in the original terms of the debt
issue"(Standard and Poor's (2006)).
4debt still matter if we account for other determinants of sovereign risk and the
potential endogeneity of international borrowing and lending? Is this relationship
driven by a particular group of countries or limited to a speci¯c time interval?
Our ¯ndings suggest that there is indeed a case to be made that a high share of
the private sector in countries' external debt is more of a boon than a burden:
an exogenous increase of this share reduces sovereign risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section o®ers a review of
the relevant literature and highlights our own contribution. Section 3 introduces
our empirical speci¯cation, the data we use, and comments on the results. Section
4 summarizes and concludes. Detailed information on data de¯nitions and sources
are given in the data appendix.
2 Review of the Literature
There is a rich literature on the causes and consequences of sovereign risk. Much
of the theory departs from the notion that, in the absence of a supra-national
enforcement institution, the incentive to repay crucially hinges on the sanctions a
government faces in case of default. These sanctions can be subdivided into two
main types: starting with Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), it has been argued that
governments avoid default in order to preserve access to future loans. However,
this idea was criticized by Bulow and Rogo® (1989) who demonstrate that a
sovereign debtor can achieve a higher welfare level by denying repayment and by
investing the outstanding amount in a third country. Hence, unless it is possible
to exclude countries from ¯nancial markets both as debtors and as creditors, only
the threat of direct sanctions { including negative \reputation spillovers" (Cole
and Kehoe (1997)) { is e®ective to enforce repayment.5
While the notion that defaulting governments are shut o® from interna-
5An authoritative survey of this discussion is provided by Eaton and Fernandez (1995).
5tional capital markets gets mixed empirical support (see Eichengreen and Lindert
(1989), Gelos et al. (2003)), there is ample evidence that a debt crisis imposes
large costs on the economy: Rose (2005) demonstrates that the volume of trade
is reduced by as much as eight percent for a considerable time span after a sov-
ereign default. De Paoli et al. (2006) as well as Borensztein and Panizza (2006)
document that defaults are associated with sharp declines in aggregate output.
It is quite obvious, however, that the costs of default do not a®ect all citizens of
a country in a symmetric fashion. In fact, there is strong evidence that \political
factors" { e.g. the proximity of elections or the characteristics of the institutional
environment { have a signi¯cant e®ect on countries' perceived creditworthiness
and the likelihood of default.6 Nevertheless, there are few studies that explicitly
consider the distributional e®ects of debt crises and agents' con°icting interests
with respect to sovereign default. Notable exceptions are Tomz (2002), Tomz
(2004), Arteta and Hale (2008) as well as IMF (2002). Tomz (2002) analyzes the
shift in popular attitude that preceded the Argentine default of 2001. In par-
ticular, he documents how the sentiment of workers increasingly turned against
compliance with international repayment obligations. Tomz (2004) presents the
results of a survey which relates agents' attitude towards debt repayment to their
professional and educational background. Not surprisingly, agents for whom ac-
cess to international capital markets is important advocate debt repayment while
public employees and individuals who are dependent on public welfare payments
appreciate the relaxed budget constraint that comes along with sovereign de-
fault. The empirical ¯ndings of Arteta and Hale (2008) point into the same
direction: sovereign default substantially worsens ¯rms' access to international
credit markets and thus hurts those who are most reliant on foreign credit. IMF
(2002) analyzes the distributional consequences of four recent default episodes.
6See, e.g., Manasse et al. (2003), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004), Block and Vaaler
(2004).
6In some of these cases, default was associated with a sharp depreciation of the
domestic currency. This depreciation \...eroded the balance sheets of banks, par-
ticularly those with signi¯cant open foreign exchange positions" (IMF 2002:15).
By contrast, \... others, particularly low-leveraged ¯rms, reaped bene¯ts from
the depreciation" (IMF 2002:16). These observations single out private agents
with a large exposure to international capital markets as a group whose wealth
and income is particularly a®ected by the government's default decision and sug-
gests a distributional con°ict between those individuals on the one hand and
workers, non-leveraged ¯rms, and public-sector employees on the other hand. In
Celasun and Harms (2007), we present a simple model that formalizes this notion
by juxtaposing \workers" and \entrepreneurs": while workers are predominantly
interested in low taxes and therefore support default, entrepreneurs who borrow
abroad to ¯nance their investments su®er a capital loss in case of default and
thus advocate repayment. In this model, a larger \entrepreneurial class" { i.e.
a greater volume of private external borrowing { increases the political costs of
default and therefore raises sovereign creditworthiness.
The alternative view that private-sector borrowing is harmful for a country's
creditworthiness focuses on private agents' incentives to deny debt repayment
and the consequences for the aggregate economy. Jeske (2006) presents a model
in which private agents who default on their external debt are still allowed to
borrow on domestic capital markets. This raises the attractiveness of private
default and constrains a country's ability to borrow abroad. While default never
takes place in equilibrium, the important point of Jeske's paper is that { in terms
of creditworthiness { public borrowing is superior to private borrowing. The view
that large private sector external debt is a source of ¯nancial risk for the public
sector is also supported by anecdotal evidence on private debt nationalizations
7after currency and ¯nancial crises.7 For instance Reinhart (2002) states that
"...even if the government itself has little outstanding debt, history has shown
that, time after time, governments assume private sector debt during currency
crises." Hence, it is possible that private borrowing is more of a burden than
a boon to sovereign creditworthiness since private agents frequently succumb
to over-borrowing, and since a high level of private-sector debt may threaten
government solvency even in cases of healthy public ¯nances.8
To determine which of the theoretical e®ects sketched above is dominant we
estimate how the share of the private sector in total external debt a®ects coun-
tries' perceived creditworthiness and the likelihood of sovereign default. Both
the empirical studies on the determinants of sovereign defaults (Detragiache and
Spilimbergo (2001), Manasse et al. (2003), Manasse and Roubini (2005)) and the
literature on sovereign ratings (Cantor and Packer (1996), Haque et al. (1996),
Harms and Rauber (2006), Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006), Borio and Packer
(1996) Afonso et al. (2007)) support the notion that high external debt is an
important cause of debt crises. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of
them considers the potentially di®erent impact of private and public debt.9
7See, e.g., Larrain and Velasco (1990) for an account of private debt nationalizations and
the Chilean external debt restructuring during the 1982 crisis.
8Corsetti et al. (1999) identify excessive foreign borrowing by the private sector as one of the
key causes of the Asian currency crises of 1997-1998. Indonesia, one of the countries hit hardest
by the crisis, restructured its foreign currency bank debt in 1998-99 and was thus classi¯ed by
Standards and Poor's as being in sovereign default status at that time.
9A notable exception is Frankel and Rose (1996) who explore inter alia how the share of
the public sector in total external debt a®ects the occurrence of currency crises. Interestingly,
a higher share of the government raises the likelihood of a currency crash in the subsequent
year. By contrast, the e®ect of the public sector-share on currency crises in the same period is
not signi¯cant.
83 Empirical analysis
3.1 Creditworthiness and defaults
The goal of this paper is to investigate whether an increasing share of the private
sector in external debt a®ects developing countries' creditworthiness and the like-
lihood of sovereign default. We proceed in two steps: in a ¯rst set of regressions,
we estimate the impact of private sector exposure on a widely-used indicator of
creditworthiness, namely the Institutional Investor's country credit rating. In a
later section, we then estimate whether the share of private debt has an e®ect on
the occurrence of actual defaults.
Our data set covers 65 developing countries and emerging markets for the
years 1980 { 2005. The unit of time measurement we adopt is ¯ve years, and the
variables used in our regressions will either be ¯ve-year averages (1981-85, 1986-
1990, ..., 2001-2005), or initial values preceding the respective ¯ve-year periods
(1980, 1985, ..., 2000). We will be interested in the following question: how
does a change of the private-sector share in total external debt a®ect average
creditworthiness and the likelihood of sovereign default in the subsequent ¯ve
years? Our choice of ¯ve-year averages is based on the notion that many of the
theoretical mechanisms sketched above are likely to have a discernible e®ect on
creditworthiness only at a low frequency. In addition, our dynamic structure has
the virtues of simplicity and transparency: using annual data would require a
more sophisticated dynamic speci¯cation and would possibly lead to coe±cients
that are di±cult to interpret. Moreover, it would be much harder to address
issues like unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity.10
While focusing on actual defaults seems straightforward at ¯rst glance, it
comes with a number of serious di±culties: ¯rst, there is no generally accepted
10Note, however, that we are able to replicate most of the qualitative results reported below
with annual data.
9de¯nition of sovereign default. In our analysis, we rely on the de¯nition of the rat-
ing agency Standard and Poor's, which characterizes sovereign defaults as \...the
failure to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the
speci¯ed grace period) contained in the original terms of the debt issue" (Stan-
dard and Poor's (2006)). While this approach has the advantage of applying
a straightforward and transparent criterion, it does not consider the size of ar-
rears, nor does it capture those latent debt crises whose occurrence was prevented
by foreign rescue operations and concessions.11 A further problem with exclu-
sively focusing on actual default episodes is that governments' creditworthiness
frequently recovers while they are still negotiating the terms on which to repay
existing arrears. During these periods, they are technically \in default", but the
likelihood to deny repayment in the future may be much lower than suggested
by their default status.
Therefore, as a ¯rst step, we use Institutional Investor's measure of coun-
try creditworthiness (IICCR) which is likely to represent a more delicate and
informative seismograph of investors' assessment whether current loans will be
repaid in the future. The IICCR ranks countries on a scale from 0 to 100, with
a lower rating re°ecting a higher likelihood that borrowers in this country will
default on their debt. The ratings are \...based on information provided by senior
economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and money man-
agement and securities ¯rms" (Institutional Investor, 2002:170) and have been
published twice per year since 1979.12 Although it does not exclusively refer to
11Given these considerations, Manasse et al. (2003) augment the Standard-and-Poors data
with information on concessional IMF loans, while Beim and Calomiris (2001) di®erentiate be-
tween outright repudiation and minor, pre-announced defaults. Rose (2005) identi¯es sovereign
defaults with the onset of Paris-Club negotiations, Arteta and Hale (2008) combine information
about renegotiations with those of Standard and Poor's and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
12As reported by Haque et al. (1996), the individual criteria used by banks to assess default
risk are not speci¯ed.
10the likelihood of government default, we conjecture that sovereign risk makes up
for a large share of \country creditworthiness". Our conjecture is con¯rmed by
comparing the Institutional Investor's indicator to ratings which more explicitly
focus on government creditworthiness, but cover a smaller number of countries
and years.13
The performance of rating agencies in predicting ¯nancial crises has frequently
been criticized in the recent past. However, Reinhart (2002) documents that
credit ratings do a fairly good job in predicting sovereign defaults. This notion
is con¯rmed by the numbers in Table 2, which gives the results of regressing the
variable SOV DEFAULT on the Institutional Investor's measure of creditwor-
thiness. SOV DEFAULT is a binary variable which is one if Standard and Poors
rated a government to be in default at least once during a ¯ve-year period (1981-
85, 1986-90 etc.) and zero otherwise. IICCRini is the value of IICCR in the
year preceding that period (1980, 1985 etc.). The regression is based on a probit
model and includes both regional dummies and time dummies. The Institutional
Investor credit rating has a signi¯cant relationship with the likelihood of default.
Evaluated at the mean, raising IICCRini by one percentage point reduces the
likelihood of default by about one percentage point. In terms of goodness of ¯t,
the regression performs reasonably well: 81 percent of default episodes and 72
percent of the episodes without default are correctly predicted. Column (2.2) of
Table 2 demonstrates that IICCRini is still signi¯cant if we include the lagged
value of SOV DEFAULT: hence, it is a good predictor of future defaults even
if we control for the possibility that past defaults both raise the probability of
future defaults and reduce current creditworthiness.14
13The IICCR has been widely used in empirical work on sovereign creditworthiness, given
its coverage of a large number of countries and years. The rank correlation between the IICCR
and the sovereign ratings published by Moody's in the 1990s is 0.92. The rank-correlation with
the sovereign ratings of FitchRatings is 0.85.
14We performed the same exercise using ¯ve-year averages (IICCRav) instead of initial
113.2 Private debt and creditworthiness: data and model
speci¯cation
To investigate how a larger share of the private sector in total external debt a®ects
perceived creditworthiness, we estimate variants of the following equation:
IICCR
av







°k xk;it + »t + "it (1)
where IICCRav
it is the Institutional Investor's average measure of country
creditworthiness for country i in period t, and PRIV SHAREini
it is the initial
percentage share of country i's long-term private external debt in its total long-
term external debt at the start of period t. Both the numerator and the denomi-
nator of this ratio are taken from the World Bank's Global Development Finance,
which de¯nes private non-guaranteed long-term debt outstanding and disbursed
as \...an external obligation of a private debtor that is not guaranteed for re-
payment by a public entity". To compute the denominator of PRIV SHAREini,
we take the sum of private and public long-term debt. Public long-term debt
comprises \...long-term external obligations of public debtors [...] and external
obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by a public entity
"(World Bank (2007b)).15 The variable DEBT ini is the initial level of external
debt { short-term and long-term { relative to GNI.16 Note that by using the val-
ues of PRIV SHARE and DEBT observed at the end of the previous ¯ve-year
values. This variable correctly \predicts" almost 100 percent of all defaults { which is not
surprising, given that risk ratings usually drop substantially once a government declares default.
15The variable PRIV SHAREini is based on long-term debt since the public versus private
sector decomposition is not available for short-term debt. As we will show later, the focus on
long-term debt does not appear to be consequential for our empirical results.
16For the time being, we do not distinguish between di®erent sources of loans. That is, public
borrowing comprises both loans from o±cial sources and loans from private investors. As we
will show later, this aggregation is not crucial for our results.
12period we are reducing the potential for reverse causality, i.e. of creditworthiness
a®ecting private and public borrowing behavior.
Our choice of control variables xk;it largely follows the studies of Haque et al.
(1996) as well as Harms and Rauber (2006). First, we use the lagged ¯ve-year
average of the IICCR as a regressor (IICCRav(¡1)). A dynamic speci¯cation is
suggested by Haque et al. (1996:718) who ¯nd that \there is considerable persis-
tence in the ratings, so that a country tends to retain its rating over time unless
signi¯cant adverse or positive developments occur". Moreover, by controlling for
lagged IICCRav, we further reduce the potential endogeneity of the debt vari-
ables: if a positive correlation between PRIV SHAREini and IICCRav were only
driven by the high persistence of credit ratings and the fact that PRIV SHAREini
reacts to ratings of the past, the correlation should disappear once lagged cred-
itworthiness is explicitly taken into account.
A correlation between initial private sector debt and average creditworthi-
ness could, of course, also re°ect the expectation of more favorable economic and
political conditions in the future: it is quite plausible that private sector bor-
rowing expands more than proportionately in anticipation of a boom, and that
such an upswing is also re°ected by a rising measure of creditworthiness. To
account for this possibility, we introduce two proxies for \economic prospects":
the average growth rate of real per-capita GDP in the preceding ¯ve-year pe-
riod (GROWTHav(¡1)) and the average growth rate of the main trading part-
ners' GDP (TPGROWTHav) in the current period. The advantage of using
trading partners' growth is that this variable { while being signi¯cantly cor-
related with domestic growth { is unlikely to be endogenous with respect to
IICCRav.17 We also include the ¯ve-year average of an index of government sta-
bility (GOV STABILITY av), compiled by the International Country Risk Guide,
17Including the growth rate of domestic output did not alter the qualitative results we report
in subsequent sections.
13which captures the extent of political risk during a given time period, and which
is likely to a®ect both creditworthiness and private borrowing.18
To account for the possibility that the share of the private sector in total
external debt merely re°ects the level of economic development, we include the
logarithm of real per-capita income (in international dollars) at the end of the
previous ¯ve year period. (INCOMEPCini). Moreover we use measures of
¯nancial and macroeconomic stability which are likely to a®ect both private bor-
rowing and creditworthiness: the initial volume of reserves as a share of imports
(RESERV ESini) and the log of the average in°ation rate in the preceding ¯ve-
year period (INFLAav(¡1)). We also include the initial degree of trade openness
(OPENini), measured as the ratio of exports and imports to GNI. Since more
open economies are more vulnerable to the declines in foreign trade identi¯ed
by Rose (2005), their willingness to default should be lower. At the same time,
countries that are more open are likely to be more vulnerable to external shocks
and may thus face a higher risk of default.
Finally, we use dummies for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
South Asia, Latin America and Subsaharan Africa to account for regional dif-
ferences as well as time dummies »t to capture time-variant factors { changes in
world interest rates or investor sentiment { that in°uence all countries' credit-
worthiness.
18GOV STABILITY av is the sum of three subcomponents, namely government unity, leg-
islative strength, and popular support.
143.3 Private debt and creditworthiness: results
3.3.1 Private debt and creditworthiness: benchmark regressions
Column (3.1) of Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (1) by OLS.19
All control variables have the expected sign. The coe±cient on DEBT ini is
highly signi¯cant, con¯rming the notion that a large level of external debt reduces
creditworthiness.20 Most importantly for our analysis, the share of private sector
debt { as re°ected by PRIV SHAREini has a signi¯cantly positive coe±cient,
implying that ceteris paribus, countries with a higher share of private debt in
total external debt would be expected to have higher creditworthiness.21
Column (3.2) of Table 3 includes the second lag of IICCRav as an additional
regressor: if the serial correlation of creditworthiness goes beyond one period and
if private debt is slow to react to changes in credit rankings, omission of this
variable could lead to biased estimates. However, this does not seem to be the
case: while the second lag of IICCRav has a signi¯cantly negative coe±cient,
the estimated coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini is almost una®ected.
The results so far suggest that a higher share of the private sector in total
external debt is signi¯cantly associated with a higher level of creditworthiness.
However, the signi¯cantly positive coe±cients could just indicate that countries
with a more developed ¯nancial sector have a larger share of private external
debt and run a lower risk of sovereign default. To account for this possibility we
19The standard errors presented in squared brackets are based on a covariance matrix that is
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of cluster-speci¯c disturbances.
20This result is due to dropping the observation for Nicaragua in 1990, which is character-
ized by an excessively high level of external debt (1087 percent of GNI). Including this data
point substantially increases the standard error of DEBT ini without, however, changing the
qualitative results with respect to the other regressors.
21This result does not hinge on our indiscriminate treatment of private and o±cial creditors.
If we constrain our attention to debt owed to private agents and institutions { thus netting out
o±cial loans { we get a somewhat smaller, but signi¯cantly positive coe±cient.
15include the initial value of domestic credit to the private sector relative to GDP
(DOMCREDIT ini) as a measure of ¯nancial depth. Column (3.3) demonstrates
that, while this variable has a positive sign, it is not signi¯cant and its inclusion
has almost no e®ect on the coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini.
Column (3.4) of Table 3 reports the results of replacing GOV STABILITY av
with another measure of the investment climate. The variable GOV ERNANCEav
is also based on the International Country Risk Guide's assessments, but refers
to di®erent criteria { namely the control of corruption, the quality of the bu-
reaucracy, and the rule of law. While this modi¯cation slightly lowers the size of
the coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini, the e®ect is not substantial, and the variable
remains signi¯cant.
We also considered another disaggregation of external debt which possibly
a®ects country creditworthiness and which might be correlated with private-
sector exposure: column (3.5) in Table 3 reports the result of including the
variable STDEBT ini, which re°ects the share of short-term debt in total ex-
ternal debt. It turns out that this variable has no signi¯cant independent e®ect
on perceived creditworthiness, and that its inclusion does not in°uence the coef-
¯cient of PRIV SHAREini.22
3.3.2 Private debt and creditworthiness: accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity
There is, of course, a high probability that the regressors we have included do
not capture all sources of cross-country heterogeneity. The positive coe±cient of
PRIV SHAREini may thus merely re°ect the in°uence of other country-speci¯c
factors which a®ect both private borrowing and creditworthiness. Moreover, we
22To further explore whether the maturity structure of external debt was important for our
results we ran our benchmark regression under the two alternative assumptions that all short-
term external debt was either private or public. It turned out that the modi¯ed values of
PRIV SHAREini still had a signi¯cantly positive impact on IICCRav.
16have not yet come to terms with the possible endogeneity of PRIV SHAREini:
while we have argued above that regressing the ¯ve-year average of IICCRav
on the initial share of private debt in total external liabilities should reduce the
potential for reverse causality { especially, when the lagged measure of creditwor-
thiness is included { there are more sophisticated ways to deal with this issue.
In this subsection, we ¯rst follow the approach of Arellano and Bond (1991)
and estimate the parameters of interest by di®erencing equation (1) and by using
lagged levels of the regressors as instruments.23 The results in column (4.1) of
Table 4 are based on a speci¯cation that uses up to four lags of the regressors as
instruments. To avoid the over¯tting that comes along with an excessive number
of moment conditions and that results in biases and uninformative diagnostic
statistics, we impose the condition that the coe±cients are uniform across the
time periods in the ¯rst stage.24 Moreover, we adopt a two-step approach that
uses an optimal weighting matrix to aggregate the individual moment conditions.
Standard errors are computed using the ¯nite sample correction suggested by
Windmeijer (2005). The p-values referring to Hansen's J-test of overidentifying
restrictions (Hansen (1982)) and to the (m2-)test of no second-order autocorre-
lation in the di®erenced residuals (Arellano and Bond (1991)) are given at the
bottom of the table. As the results in column (4.1) show, most coe±cients change
when we move from pooled OLS to the \Di®erence-GMM estimator" of Arellano
and Bond (1991), suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity may
indeed have in°uenced the results presented in Table 3. Nevertheless, our ¯nd-
ing that the share of the private sector in total external debt raises countries'
creditworthiness is strengthened rather than weakened.
Column (4.2) shows the results of applying the estimator developed by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to equation (1). This
23Bond (2002) and Wooldridge (2002a) o®er excellent surveys on dynamic panel estimation.
We used the xtabond2 module by Roodman (2006) to implement the di®erence-GMM estimator.
24We do this by using the collapse option in the xtabond2 routine in Stata.
17approach simultaneously estimates the ¯rst-di®erenced version of the regression
equation { using lagged levels of the right-hand-side variables { and the original
equation in levels using lagged di®erences as instruments. The ¯rst advantage
of this \Systems-GMM" estimator is that it exploits the information contained
in the ¯rst period { a property that is of particular merit in our case where the
number of periods is small. Moreover, it mitigates the weak-instruments problem
that arises if the time series involved are very persistent. Column (4.2) in Table
4 demonstrates that, with this speci¯cation, the coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini
is signi¯cantly positive.
So far, we have followed the standard approach of using lags of all regres-
sors as instruments. While the J-test gives no warning signs, our results may be
biased if the right-hand side variables are endogenous. We are particularly con-
cerned about PRIV SHAREini and DEBT ini and therefore remove these vari-
ables from the list of instruments. Column (4.3) in Table 4 presents the results of
following this approach when the \Di®erence-GMM" estimator is used, column
(4.4) refers to the \Systems-GMM" estimator. In both cases, the coe±cient of
PRIV SHAREini remains signi¯cant.
The last columns of Table 4 present the results of treating the problems of
unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of PRIV SHAREini sep-
arately: ¯rst, we estimated our model with ¯xed e®ects. To account for the
bias inherent in dynamic-panel estimation (Nickell (1981)) we applied the bias-
correction suggested by Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005).25 As indicated by col-
umn (4.5), using this \corrected LSDV (LSDVC)" estimator barely changes the
coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini as compared to the pooled OLS results reported in
Table 3. Finally, we accounted for the potential endogeneity of PRIV SHAREini
by instrumenting this variable with potential determinants of private-sector bor-
25To compute these results, we used the xtlsdvc routine developed for Stata by Giovanni
Bruno.
18rowing: the (lagged) quality of ¯nancial sector regulation (CREDREGav(¡1))
which is based on an index compiled by the Fraser Institute (Fraser Institute
(2006)), the distance from the equator (LATITUDEav) and the lagged average
of the Freedom House index of civil liberties (REPRESSav(¡1)) as proxies for
the quality of governance (Freedom House (2006)), and the initial number of tele-
phone main lines per 1000 people (TELEPHONESini) as a proxy for the quality
of a country's infrastructure. The Cragg-Donald statistic of instrument relevance
(see Cragg and Donald (1993) and Stock and Yogo (2005)) and Hansen's J-test
of overidentifying restrictions indicate that these instruments perform reason-
ably well in terms of relevance and exogeneity, and, importantly, instrumenting
for (PRIV SHAREini) does not strongly a®ect its estimated coe±cient. The
notion that the coe±cient of initial private sector debt is not driven by reverse
causality is also supported by an explicit test for endogeneity which prevents us
from rejecting the hypothesis that (PRIV SHAREini) is actually exogenous.26
We conclude from the results presented in this subsection that accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity changes the size of the
estimated parameters { without, however, a®ecting our key ¯nding that a higher
share of the private sector in total external debt raises a country's creditworthi-
ness.
3.3.3 Private debt and creditworthiness: varying samples
This section reports the results of estimating equation (1) using various subsets
of the original sample. It is apparent from Figure 3b) that in a large number
of countries, all external borrowing is done by the government. We explored
whether dropping the observations for which PRIV SHAREini was zero changes
the coe±cient of this regressor. Column (5.1) of Table 5 demonstrates that it does
26To test for endogeneity, we used both the Wu-Durbin-Hausman-test and the Di®erence-in-
Sargan test implemented in Stata by Baum et al. (2003) and Baum et al. (2006).
19not. We then restricted our attention to countries for whom IICCR exceeded the
value of 25. Reinhart et al. (2003) identify this value as a threshold below which
countries do not really have access to international capital markets. Column
(5.2) demonstrates that the size of the coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini is slightly
reduced in this case, but the signi¯cantly positive estimated e®ect is not a®ected.
Finally, we checked whether our result depended on the simultaneous decline of
creditworthiness and private foreign borrowing that could be observed during
the 1980s. As column (5.3) of Table 5 reports, excluding the observations from
the \lost decade" reduces the sample by almost one third, but barely a®ects the
coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini.
Columns (5.4) to (5.6) report the results of estimating equation (1) for the
subsamples described above, using the Di®erence-GMM estimator of Arellano and
Bond (1991). Again, dropping those observations for which PRIV SHAREini was
zero (column 5.4) or those in which creditworthiness did not exceed a minimum
threshold (column 5.5) did not alter our key result { nor did restricting attention
to the years after 1990 (column 5.6).
3.4 Private debt and sovereign default: results
3.4.1 Benchmark results
So far, we have used the Institutional Investor's measure of creditworthiness
as a dependent variable. While we found strong evidence that the perceived
likelihood of sovereign default is reduced by a larger share of the private sector in
total external debt, this does not necessarily prove that governments' decisions
on default vs. repayment are actually a®ected by private sector exposure. To
explore whether this is indeed the case we now use the dummy SOV DEFAULT
as the dependent variable. As described in section 3.1, this variable is one if
Standard and Poor's rated a government as being in default { i.e. failing to meet
its repayment obligations { for at least one year in a ¯ve-year interval and zero
20otherwise. Except for the lagged indicator of creditworthiness, we are using the
same set of covariates as in the previous subsections.
Our ¯rst regression uses the probit estimator to identify the determinants of
sovereign defaults. The results are reported in column (6.1) of Table 6. With the
exception of INCOMEPCini, the coe±cients of the control variables have the
expected sign { although only lagged growth and the initial debt to GNI ratio are
statistically signi¯cant. PRIV SHAREini clearly has a negative relationship with
the likelihood of default. At the bottom of Table 6, we report the partial e®ect
of this variable: evaluated at the sample mean, an increase of PRIV SHAREini
by roughly one percentage point ceteris paribus reduces the likelihood of default
by one percentage point. As column (6.2) in Table 6 shows, using the logit
estimator instead of probit yields a marginal e®ect of almost identical size. In
terms of goodness of ¯t, both approaches do reasonably well: The pseudo¡R2 of
McFadden (1974) is approximately 0.31 in both cases, and the percent correctly
predicted is 75 percent.27
There might, however, be a problem with taking these results at face value:
as the previous sections have indicated, sovereign creditworthiness is quite persis-
tent { even if we focus on ¯ve-year averages. This is likely to apply a fortiori to
actual defaults: after the initial denial of full repayment, it usually takes several
years until an agreement with creditors is reached. During this period the coun-
try is rated as a defaulter. This, in turn, is likely to a®ect private borrowing (see
Arteta and Hale (2008)). Hence, the negative coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini
may just capture the persistence of defaults, combined with the negative e®ect
of past defaults on private external borrowing. Columns (6.3) and (6.4) in Ta-
ble 6 indicate that this conjecture is at least partly correct: the coe±cient of
the ¯rst lag of SOV DEFAULT is signi¯cantly positive, and the in°uence of
27Probit (Logit) correctly predicts 77.9 (78.7) percent of all defaults and 72.1 (72.1) percent
of all non-defaults.
21PRIV SHAREini decreases once we include the ¯rst lag of the dependent vari-
able. However, as the partial e®ects at the bottom of Table 6 reveal, this change
is quite limited: once we include the lagged dependent variable, it takes an in-
crease of PRIV SHAREini by approximately 1.3 percentage point to reduce the
likelihood of default by 1 percentage point. The entries in the bottom rows in-
dicate that including the lagged dependent variable improves the ¯t, but not by
very much: the pseudo ¡ R2 moves from 0.31 to 0.36 while the percent correctly
predicted increases from 75 to 81 and 82, respectively.
3.4.2 Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
As in the previous subsections, we need to be concerned about unobserved hetero-
geneity: the likelihood of default may depend on country-speci¯c characteristics
which we have not explicitly accounted for in our regression equation. While in-
troducing country-speci¯c e®ects is the straightforward solution to this problem
in a linear regression model, things are a bit more complicated when it comes
to discrete-choice models. The probit estimator, in particular, su®ers from the
incidental parameters problem { i.e. it is not possible to consistently estimate
the coe±cients of the covariates using maximum likelihood without estimating
the country-speci¯c e®ects. This, in turn, fails if the number of time periods is
¯nite.28 There are several remedies to this problem: under the assumption that
the individual e®ects are not correlated with the covariates, the random e®ects
probit estimator yields consistent estimates (Wooldridge (2002a)). Column (7.1)
in Table 7 shows the results of adopting this approach. Column (7.2) reports
the coe±cients we get when estimating the random e®ects model using logit: in-
terestingly, the partial e®ects for PRIV SHAREini (-0.014 and -0.015) do not
28Chapter 15 in Wooldridge (2002a) o®ers an excellent treatment of this issue. Further
discussions of this issue can be found in Lancaster (2000) and Greene (2001).
22stray too far from the values we received from the pooled regression in Table 6.29
Column (7.3) reports the results from applying the ¯xed e®ects logit estimator. If
the distribution of the underlying error term is assumed to be logistic, consistent
estimation of the relevant parameters is possible even if unobserved heterogeneity
is treated by means of ¯xed e®ects. However, this advantage comes at a cost:
since the ¯xed e®ects cannot be estimated, it is impossible to compute partial
e®ects. Hence, the magnitude of the negative coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini in
column (7.3) cannot be readily compared with our previous results. To better
understand the role of unobserved heterogeneity we ¯nally speci¯ed the model as
a simple linear equation including ¯xed e®ects.30 Interestingly, the coe±cient of
PRIV SHAREini in column (7.4) is very close to the partial e®ects we reported
in Table 6.
The last two columns in Table 7 return to the issue of whether the signi¯cantly
negative e®ect of PRIV SHAREini merely re°ects the persistence of sovereign
defaults. To explore this issue, we include the lagged value of SOV DEFAULT
as an additional regressor, adopting two alternative approaches: we ¯rst follow
Wooldridge (2002b) who suggests to estimate a random-e®ects (logit or probit)
model conditioning on initial observations. The results of this strategy are pre-
sented in column (7.5) of Table 7: while the lagged dependent variable is signif-
icant, the coe±cient of PRIV SHAREini is still signi¯cantly negative, and the
estimated marginal e®ect barely di®ers from the one displayed at the bottom of
column (7.1). However, this estimator is biased unless the other regressors are
strictly exogenous. Hence, as a robustness check, we also estimated the linear
probability (LPM) model with a lagged dependent variable and ¯xed e®ects. As
29These partial e®ects are evaluated under the assumption that the unobserved e®ect equals
zero.
30While the linear probability model (LPM) has the drawback that the predicted values do
not necessarily fall into the zero-one interval, the estimated marginal e®ects are often close to
those delivered by probit and logit models.
23column (7.6) demonstrates, the lagged dependent variable has no impact on the
other coe±cients in this case. Of course, given the caveats with respect to this
estimator, we do not want to overrate this result. The main ¯nding we take away
from these estimations is that the signi¯cantly negative e®ect of PRIV SHAREini
on sovereign defaults does not seem to be an artifact of neglecting unobserved
heterogeneity and the persistence of defaults.
4 Summary and conclusions
While external debt ¯gures among the usual suspects when it comes to explaining
sovereign risk, little attention has been devoted to the potentially di®erent e®ects
of private and public external debt. The main contribution of our paper is to
emphasize that this di®erence is substantial: a higher share of the private sector
in total external debt raises country creditworthiness and reduces the likelihood
of default. Our results thus o®er one potential explanation for the observation
of Reinhart et al. (2003) that countries with similar levels of external debt may
exhibit vast di®erences in their creditworthiness and their propensity to default:
\debt intolerance" may more heavily a²ict countries where the government ac-
counts for most of the external borrowing.
We have gone at great lengths to show that our results are not driven by
unobserved heterogeneity { i.e. creditworthiness and private sector exposure
being driven by country-speci¯c unobserved parameters { and that they do not
just re°ect the reverse impact of creditworthiness on private borrowing. Our
¯ndings suggest that, for a given country, an exogenous increase of private debt
as a share of total external debt raises creditworthiness and reduces the likelihood
of default. An explanation as to why countries exhibit such large di®erences in
the composition of their external debt goes beyond the scope of this paper, but
o®ers a very promising subject for future research.
245 Data appendix
5.1 De¯nitions and sources
CREDREGav: Five-year average of the Fraser Institute's index of credit market reg-
ulation, ranging from 0 (minimal regulation) to 10 (maximal regulation). Criteria: (i)
Ownership of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks; (ii) Com-
petition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks; (iii) Extension of credit:
percentage of credit extended to private sector; (iv) Avoidance of interest rate controls
and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates; (v) Interest rate controls: in-
terest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the market.
Source: Fraser Institute (2006).
DEBTini: Total external debt relative to GNI. \Total external debt is debt owed to
nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is
the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt,
use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an
original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data
are in current U.S. dollars." Sources: World Bank (2007a) and World Bank (2007b).
DOMCREDITini: Domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP. \Domestic credit
to private sector refers to ¯nancial resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims in-
clude credit to public enterprises." Source: World Bank (2007a).
GOV ERNANCEav: Simple average of indices measuring bureaucratic quality, corrup-
tion, and the rule of law, from the International Country Risk Guide. Source: Political
Risk Services (2006).
GOV STABILITY av: Index of government stability from the International Country
Risk Guide. Source: Political Risk Services (2006).
GROWTHav(¡1): Average growth rate of real-per capita income in the preceding
25¯ve-year period. Source: Penn World Table 6.2 (Heston et al. (2006)).
IICCRav: Five-year average of the country credit ratings published in the Institu-
tional Investor magazine every March and September since 1980. Source: Institutional
Investor magazine.
INCOMEPCini: Log of initial value of real per capita income in constant PPP-
adjusted dollars. Source: World Bank (2007a).
INFLAav(¡1): Log of the average growth rate of the consumer price index in the
preceding ¯ve-year period. Source: World Bank (2007a).
OPENini: Initial value of the ratio (Exports + imports)/GNI. Source: World Bank
(2007a).
LATITUDE: Squared latitude. Source: World Bank (2001).
PRIV SHAREini: Initial share of private nonguaranteed long-term external debt in
total long-term external debt. \Private nonguaranteed debt outstanding and disbursed
(LDOD) is an external obligation of a private debtor that is not guaranteed for repay-
ment by a public entity. Long-term debt outstanding and disbursed (LDOD) is the
total outstanding long-term debt at year end. Long-term external debt is de¯ned as
debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed
to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services." Source: World
Bank (2007b).
REPRESSav: Five-year average of the Freedom House index of civil liberties, ranging
from 1 (maximal rights) to 7 (minimal rights). Source: Freedom House (2006).
RESERV ESini: Initial value of the ratio (International reserves)/(Imports of goods
and services). Source: World Bank (2007a).
SOV DEFAULT: Dummy variable. One if Standard and Poors rates a government
to be in default at least once during a ¯ve-year period and zero otherwise. A default
is characterized by \...the failure to meet a principal or interest payment on the due
date (or within the speci¯ed grace period) contained in the original terms of the debt
issue" (Standard and Poor's (2006)). Source: Standard and Poor's (2007).
STDEBTini: Short-term debt to total external debt. \Short-term external debt is de-
26¯ned as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Available data permit no
distinction between public and private nonguaranteed short-term debt." Source: World
Bank (2007b).
TELEPHONESini: Number of telephone main lines per 1000 people. Source: World
Bank (2007a).
TPGROWTHav: Five-year average of the growth rate of a weighted average of trading
partners' GDP. Sources: World Bank (2007a) and IMF (2006).
5.2 Countries
Algeria , Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, Estonia, Gabon,
Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syr-
ian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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East Asia and Pacific 0.623 0.483
[0.439] [0.454]
South Asia -0.325 0.048
[0.678] [0.675]
Europe and Central Asia 0.368 0.265
[0.388] [0.405]
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.917*** 0.874**
[0.328] [0.344]
















Marginal effect of IICCR -0.013*** -0.007**
[0.003] [0.003]
Observations 281 281
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.29
Percent correctly predicted 0.77 0.76
 
 
Notes on Table 2: Standard errors in parantheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent. 
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising five year averages or initial values between 1980-2005. The 
dependent variable is SOVDEFAULT, which is a binary variable indicating if Standard and Poor’s rated a 





 Table 3: The effect of PRIVSHARE on IICCR - Pooled OLS
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
IICCR
av(-1) 0.553*** 0.771*** 0.534*** 0.526*** 0.548***
[0.040] [0.061] [0.044] [0.047] [0.040]
PRIVSHARE
ini 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.115*** 0.093*** 0.114***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.032]
DEBT
ini -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.023***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
TPGROWTH
av 2.695* 1.544 2.667* 2.829** 2.569*
[1.370] [1.356] [1.398] [1.409] [1.417]
GROWTH
av(-1) 0.713*** 0.595*** 0.718*** 0.705*** 0.706***
[0.114] [0.152] [0.115] [0.119] [0.114]
GOVSTABILITY
av 1.253*** 1.477*** 1.237*** 1.259***
[0.312] [0.322] [0.310] [0.313]
INCOMEPC
ini 1.553 2.343** 1.372 1.391 1.431
[1.044] [1.059] [0.969] [1.110] [1.003]
RESERVES
ini 0.042** 0.057** 0.041* 0.041* 0.043*
[0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.022] [0.021]
INFLA
av(-1) -0.365 -0.079 -0.281 -0.363 -0.355
[0.452] [0.558] [0.468] [0.452] [0.453]
OPEN
ini 0.027** 0.036** 0.022* 0.029** 0.027**
[0.013] [0.017] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013]
East Asia and Pacific -0.404 -0.269 -0.499 -0.817 -0.508
[1.524] [1.777] [1.492] [1.704] [1.564]
South Asia 0.392 1.453 0.467 -1.057 0.418
[1.978] [2.083] [2.025] [2.067] [2.010]
Europe and Central Asia 4.568** 3.655* 5.354*** 2.498 4.431**
[1.793] [1.849] [1.718] [1.726] [1.874]
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.791 -1.07 -1.702 -3.187* -2.012
[1.456] [1.539] [1.344] [1.664] [1.437]
Latin America and the Caribbean -2.273** -1.744 -2.176* -3.818*** -2.407**
[1.119] [1.080] [1.128] [1.222] [1.162]
OIL -0.919 -0.553 -0.57 0.473 -0.879













Constant -17.490** -18.257** -16.031** -8.54 -16.225*
[8.585] [8.041] [7.991] [9.418] [8.529]
R-Squared (adj.) 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88
Number of Observations 257 207 255 257 257
 Notes on Table 3: Standard errors in parantheses, based on a robust covariance matrix. ***, **, * denote 
significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent. The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising five year 
averages or initial values between 1980-2005. The dependent variable is Institutional Investor’s average country 
credit rating for the five year period (IICCR
av). All regressions include time dummies; their coefficients are 
available upon request.  
 
Table 4: The effect of PRIVSHARE on IICCR - GMM and fixed effects estimation
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6)
Diff-GMM Sys-GMM Diff-GMM Sys-GMM Corrected Pooled IV
(red. instr.) (red. instr.) fixed effects
IICCR
av(-1) 0.392*** 0.484*** 0.351*** 0.470*** 0.653*** 0.525***
[0.109] [0.057] [0.099] [0.077] [0.086] [0.057]
PRIVSHARE
ini 0.213** 0.216*** 0.364*** 0.329*** 0.099* 0.181*
[0.101] [0.055] [0.093] [0.087] [0.051] [0.091]
DEBT
ini -0.013 -0.003 -0.017 -0.014 -0.041*** -0.022***
[0.017] [0.008] [0.028] [0.020] [0.014] [0.008]
TPGROWTH
av 4.312** 3.078* 4.893** 2.422 3.902** 3.276**
[1.766] [1.750] [1.978] [2.185] [1.585] [1.615]
GROWTH
av(-1) 0.705*** 0.880*** 0.573*** 0.717*** 0.717*** 0.727***
[0.231] [0.143] [0.200] [0.177] [0.208] [0.126]
GOVSTABILITY
av 1.393* 1.234*** 1.843*** 1.731*** 1.193*** 1.496***
[0.724] [0.417] [0.590] [0.414] [0.426] [0.314]
INCOMEPC
ini 7.063 -0.061 3.479 -0.276 -5.559* 1.11
[5.550] [3.195] [5.026] [4.448] [3.194] [1.105]
RESERVES
ini 0.066* 0.051* 0.059* 0.053* 0.065** 0.042*
[0.033] [0.028] [0.032] [0.027] [0.026] [0.021]
INFLA
av(-1) -1.259 -0.484 -1.041 -0.706 -0.657 -0.629
[0.760] [0.757] [0.784] [0.683] [0.478] [0.510]
OPEN
ini -0.042 0.014 -0.07 0.012 0.061* 0.023
[0.061] [0.030] [0.062] [0.039] [0.033] [0.015]
Constant -1.595 -3.108 -15.271*
[25.857] [35.771] [8.046]
R-Squared (adj.) 0.87
Number of Observations 193 257 193 257 221 245
Hansen's J-stat. (p-value) 0.26 0.4 0.4 0.48 0.42
AB m2-stat. (p-value) 0.95 0.88 0.72 0.56
Cragg-Donald stat.  8.63
 
 
Notes on Table 4: Standard errors in parantheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent. 
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising five year averages or initial values between 1980-2005. The 
dependent variable is Institutional Investor’s average country credit rating for the five year period (IICCR
av). All 
regressions include time dummies; their coefficients are available upon request. Estimates presented in columns 
(4.1)-(4.4) are based on two-step standard errors with the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. For 
columns (4.3) and (4.4) we did not use lagged values of PRIVSHARE
ini and DEBT
ini as instruments. For the 
corrected fixed effects estimation in column (4.5), the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference-GMM estimator was 
used to initialize the bias correction. Estimates presented in column (4.6) are based on robust  standard errors 
clustered by country.  
 
 
 Table 5: The effect of PRIVSHARE on IICCR - varying samples
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)
OLS OLS OLS Diff-GMM Diff-GMM Diff-GMM
PRIVSHARE > 0 IICCR > 25 No 1980s PRIVSHARE > 0 IICCR > 25 No 1980s
IICCR
av(-1) 0.554*** 0.484*** 0.592*** 0.447*** 0.402*** 0.369***
[0.047] [0.057] [0.054] [0.089] [0.134] [0.119]
PRIVSHARE
ini 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.120*** 0.194* 0.208* 0.267***
[0.035] [0.033] [0.027] [0.113] [0.108] [0.100]
DEBT
ini -0.028** -0.064*** -0.012* -0.008 -0.104*** -0.007
[0.013] [0.021] [0.006] [0.009] [0.032] [0.009]
TPGROWTH
av 3.651** 4.249*** 0.16 6.183*** 6.973** 5.333**
[1.420] [1.446] [1.529] [1.922] [2.982] [2.039]
GROWTH
av(-1) 0.705*** 0.804*** 0.729*** 0.686*** 0.59 0.743***
[0.140] [0.160] [0.143] [0.236] [0.382] [0.259]
GOVSTABILITY
av 1.378*** 1.290*** 1.188*** 1.248* 1.253 1.342*
[0.384] [0.463] [0.340] [0.702] [0.811] [0.768]
INCOMEPC
ini 1.224 2.150* 2.077* 2.525 -1.829 3.175
[1.276] [1.089] [1.102] [6.564] [8.176] [9.075]
RESERVES
ini 0.045* 0.050*** 0.057* 0.079* 0.083** 0.067
[0.023] [0.018] [0.030] [0.041] [0.033] [0.055]
INFLA
av(-1) -0.812 -2.170*** -0.033 -0.352 -1.599 -0.716
[0.623] [0.505] [0.595] [0.618] [1.025] [0.950]
OPEN
ini 0.030* 0.01 0.034** -0.032 -0.001 -0.078
[0.015] [0.012] [0.017] [0.052] [0.053] [0.056]
Constant -9.766 -18.135** -14.301
[9.047] [8.137] [8.642]
R-Squared (adj.) 0.86 0.81 0.89
Number of Observations 208 160 176 159 122 158
Hansen's J-stat. (p-value) 0.28 0.8 0.2
AB m2-stat. (p-value) 0.77 0.59 0.31  
 
Notes on Table 5: Standard errors in parantheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent. 
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising five year averages or initial values between 1980-2005. The 
dependent variable is Institutional Investor’s average country credit rating for the five year period (IICCR
av). All 
regressions include time dummies and the regressions in columns (5.1)-(5.3) include regional dummies; their 
coefficients are available upon request. Estimates presented in columns  (5.1)-(5.3) are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by country. Estimates presented in columns (5.4)-(5.6) are based on two-step standard errors 














 Table 6: The effect of PRIVSHARE on SOVDEFAULT
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4)
Probit Logit Probit Logit
with LDV with LDV
PRIVSHARE
ini -0.023** -0.040** -0.018** -0.032**
[0.009] [0.016] [0.009] [0.015]
DEBT
ini 0.011** 0.020** 0.009** 0.016**
[0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008]
TPGROWTH
av -0.322 -0.774 -0.235 -0.539
[0.501] [0.945] [0.500] [0.987]
GROWTH
av(-1) -0.078* -0.152* -0.07 -0.13
[0.044] [0.083] [0.045] [0.096]
GOVSTABILITY
av -0.173 -0.321 -0.195* -0.356*
[0.108] [0.196] [0.103] [0.182]
INCOMEPC
ini 0.492* 0.902* 0.462* 0.867*
[0.286] [0.482] [0.267] [0.477]
RESERVES
ini -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006]
INFLA
av(-1) -0.012 -0.002 -0.014 -0.008
[0.104] [0.184] [0.099] [0.182]
OPEN
ini -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
[0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.007]
East Asia and Pacific 1.199*** 2.055*** 1.019*** 1.715***
[0.398] [0.658] [0.335] [0.578]
South Asia 0.684 1.103 0.749* 1.11
[0.473] [0.853] [0.433] [0.841]
Europe and Central Asia 0.066 -0.051 -0.132 -0.351
[0.520] [0.864] [0.416] [0.693]
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.280*** 2.078*** 1.002** 1.730**
[0.470] [0.789] [0.391] [0.680]
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.172*** 1.953*** 0.822** 1.369**
[0.407] [0.718] [0.368] [0.663]
OIL 0.421* 0.713 0.419* 0.727*
[0.255] [0.452] [0.218] [0.418]
SOVDEFAULT(-1) 0.936*** 1.617***
[0.222] [0.403]
Marginal effect of PRIVSHARE -0.009** -0.010** -0.0071** -0.0079**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.0036] [0.0037]
Observations 229 229 229 229
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.36
Percent correctly predicted 75.54 75.54 81.12 82.40
 
 
Notes on Table 6: Standard errors in parantheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent. 
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising five year averages or initial values between 1980-2005. The 
dependent variable is SOVDEFAULT, which is a binary variable indicating if Standard and Poor’s rated a government as being in default at least once during a five year period. All regressions include time dummies; 
their coefficients are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for all 
regressions.  
 
Table 7: The effect of PRIVSHARE on SOVDEFAULT - probit and logit with fixed and random effects
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6)
Probit Logit Logit LPM Probit LPM
RE RE FE FE RE FE
PRIVSHARE
ini -0.035** -0.060** -0.123** -0.009** -0.036** -0.009**
[0.016] [0.028] [0.056] [0.004] [0.016] [0.004]
DEBT
ini 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.031** 0.002* 0.006* 0.002*
[0.004] [0.007] [0.013] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
TPGROWTH
av -0.438 -0.804 -1.064 -0.138 -0.349 -0.137
[0.462] [0.833] [1.068] [0.159] [0.441] [0.154]
GROWTH
av(-1) -0.093** -0.169** -0.346** -0.029*** -0.083** -0.028***
[0.041] [0.073] [0.136] [0.010] [0.039] [0.011]
GOVSTABILITY
av -0.257** -0.446** -0.588** -0.067* -0.17 -0.067*
[0.122] [0.210] [0.261] [0.035] [0.127] [0.035]
INCOMEPC
ini 0.692* 1.201** 6.591** 0.539** 0.524* 0.539**
[0.357] [0.609] [2.580] [0.243] [0.283] [0.243]
RESERVES
ini -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
[0.005] [0.009] [0.017] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001]
INFLA
av(-1) 0.047 0.074 0.2 0.042 -0.004 0.042
[0.131] [0.223] [0.362] [0.034] [0.117] [0.034]
OPEN
ini -0.004 -0.006 -0.028 -0.001 0 -0.001
[0.006] [0.010] [0.023] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002]
East Asia and Pacific 1.549* 2.615* 1.502**
[0.906] [1.536] [0.748]
South Asia 1.032 1.487 1.214
[1.163] [2.059] [0.849]
Europe and Central Asia 0.007 -0.04 -0.314
[0.791] [1.336] [0.674]
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.621** 2.698** 1.190**
[0.699] [1.183] [0.556]
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.369** 2.298** 0.754
[0.631] [1.077] [0.519]




Marginal effect of PRIVSHARE -0.0140** -0.0148** -0.0142**
0.0064 0.007 0.0065
R-Squared (adj.) 0.31 0.31
Percent correctly predicted 74.25 74.25 57.51 76.82 57.94
Number of Observations 229 229 167 229 192 229
 
 
Notes on Table 7: Standard errors in parantheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent. 
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising five year averages or initial values between 1980-2005. The 
dependent variable is SOVDEFAULT, which is a binary variable indicating if Standard and Poor’s rated a government as being in default at least once during a five year period. All regressions include time dummies; 
their coefficients are available upon request. The estimates presented in columns (7.4) and (7.6) are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by country.  Figure 1a
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Source: World Bank (Global Development Finance) Figure 2: External debt (relative to GNI) and the share of the private sector in total long-term 
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Figure 3: Initial external debt (relative to GNI) and initial share of private sector in total long-
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Sources: World Bank (Global Development Finance) and Institutional Investor. 
 
 
 
 